Narcissistic fragility: rethinking its links to explicit and implicit self-esteem by Gregg, Aiden P. & Sedikides, Constantine
  
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [University of Southampton]
On: 11 March 2010
Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 773565842]
Publisher Psychology Press
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-
41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Self and Identity
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713685324
Narcissistic Fragility: Rethinking Its Links to Explicit and Implicit Self-
esteem
Aiden P. Gregg a; Constantine Sedikides a
a University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
First published on: 18 April 2009
To cite this Article Gregg, Aiden P. and Sedikides, Constantine(2010) 'Narcissistic Fragility: Rethinking Its Links to Explicit
and Implicit Self-esteem', Self and Identity, 9: 2, 142 — 161, First published on: 18 April 2009 (iFirst)
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/15298860902815451
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15298860902815451
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Narcissistic Fragility: Rethinking Its Links to
Explicit and Implicit Self-esteem
AIDEN P. GREGG
CONSTANTINE SEDIKIDES
University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
Several studies have tested whether narcissism is a compensatory reaction to
underlying ego fragility by examining narcissism’s empirical links to both explicit
self-esteem (ESE) and implicit self-esteem (ISE), under the general expectation
that narcissists should exhibit an abundance of ESE but a dearth of ISE. However,
not only have these studies yielded conflicting findings, they have also proceeded
from divergent theoretical assumptions that shape the interpretation of their
findings. Here, we draw out the implications of three prominent models of the
interrelationships between narcissism, ESE, and ISE, before reassessing those
interrelationships in a large multi-session study. Two (out of three) indices of ISE
covaried negatively with narcissism, consistent with the view that ISE is a global
marker for ego fragility. We contextualize our findings in terms of recent research
and propose a new mechanism linking ISE to ego fragility.
Keywords: Implicit measures; Implicit self-esteem; Indirect measures; Narcissism;
Self-esteem.
Narcissism, once conceptualized as a discrete personality disorder (Akhtar &
Thomson, 1982), has been recast as a continuous individual difference (Rhodewalt &
Morf, 2005). For research purposes, it is now most often operationalized as high
scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979). Yet the
accumulating empirical portrait of the everyday narcissist remains familiar. Such
persons are egocentric (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002), prone
to illusions of superiority and specialness (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998), and
liable to be interpersonally abrasive or aggressive (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998).
The above characteristics strongly suggest that narcissists are hypermotivated to
self-enhance (Sedikides & Gregg, 2001) or unable to contain their egocentrism
(Vazire & Funder, 2006). Most tellingly, narcissists persist with a policy of shameless
self-promotion despite the long-term personal and occupational costs of doing so
(Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Why must narcissists self-aggrandize so relentlessly?
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If non-narcissists can survive feeling reasonably good about themselves, why do
narcissists need to feel so great?
The Nature of Narcissistic Self-regard
Psychodynamic theories, originally developed to explain clinical narcissism, suggest
a possible answer: narcissists’ excessive efforts to self-promote are symptomatic of
deficient rather than overabundant self-regard. In particular, narcissism has been
variously put down to compensatory distortions in terms of how one sees oneself and
others (Kohut, 1976), attempts to offset insufficient levels of parental love (Kernberg,
1975), or efforts to construct an idyllic false self in place of the imperfect real one
(Lowen, 2004). The common thread linking all these theories is that appearance
disguises reality: a shaky self hiding behind a puffed-up persona. But is there any
concrete evidence for such latent ego fragility in narcissists?
Some findings suggest not. For example, narcissism correlates positively with
adaptive traits and negatively with maladaptive traits (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg,
Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004), and narcissists are quite certain of who they are
(Tschanz & Rhodewalt, 2001). However, other findings subtly implicate ego fragility.
For example, narcissists’ affective states are more changeable than those of non-
narcissists, both in everyday life (Emmons, 1987; Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney,
1998) and in response to experimental manipulations (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic,
2004). Yet these two sets of findings are not really at odds: the first addresses
questions of central tendency, while the second addresses questions of variability.
Narcissists can exhibit higher average levels of psychological functioning (i.e., be
self-confident high performers overall) while also exhibiting greater fluctuations in
psychological functioning (i.e., be dogged by egotistical sensitivity).
Still, it would be useful to have an objective index of the ego fragility hypothesized
to underlie narcissism. Psychodynamic hypotheses (e.g., to the effect that X is really
a sign of not-X) are notoriously tricky to test, and clinical interpretations often lack
reliability or validity (Meehl, 1983). Intriguingly, however, the field of social
cognition has recently yielded a set of putative indices that may fit the bill.
Implicit Cognition, Measures, and Esteem
Extensive theory and evidence point to the mind operating at two distinct levels
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), one explicit (i.e.,
controlled, deliberate, logical, conscious, and reflective) and the other implicit (i.e.,
automatic, unintentional, associative, unconscious, and impulsive). Traditional self-
report instruments, or direct measures, are geared to index the former, whereas some
newer cognitive techniques, or indirect measures (DeHouwer, 2003), are geared to
index the latter. In particular, indirect measures elicit responses under conditions
designed to undermine one or more facets of explicit mental processing, such as
intentional control (Draine & Greenwald, 1998) or measurement awareness (Fazio,
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). The upshot is that implicit associations between
represented constructs can be inferred from patterns of response to stimuli or
combinations of stimuli (DeHouwer, 2003). Moreover, given that attitudes can be
defined as attribute–object associations (Fazio, 2007), indirect measures can be
construed as measures of implicit attitude (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007).
Self-esteem is commonly defined as a positive or negative attitude towards oneself
(Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Moreover, the concepts of ‘‘positive,’’ ‘‘negative,’’ and
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‘‘self’’ can be readily represented—the first two by valenced nouns or adjectives
(heaven vs. hell; nice vs. nasty), and the third by pronouns, names, or initials (I & me;
Aiden & Gregg; A & G). Hence, by inserting such words into indirect measures, it
becomes possible to gauge whether and to what extent people implicitly evaluate
themselves in a positive or negative way—their level of implicit self-esteem (ISE)—on
the assumption that self symbols are proxies for the actual self.
The two most commonly used indices of ISE are the Implicit Association Test
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), in which respondents attempt to
rapidly co-classify stimuli into corresponding categories, and the Name Letter Task
or Initials Preference Task (NLT or IPT; Koole & Pelham, 2003), in which
respondents, oblivious to the purpose of the task, rate their liking for letters both in
and not in their name. Whichever index is used, explicit self-esteem (ESE), measured
by conventional questionnaire, turns out to be largely independent of ISE, just as
dual-process theories would predict (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Rudolph,
Schro¨der-Abe´, Schu¨tz, Gregg, & Sedikides, 2008; but see Jordan, Whitfield, &
Zeigler-Hill, 2007).
There are also circumstantial grounds for suspecting that ISE might be an
objective marker of ego fragility in narcissists. Both pertain to self-evaluation; both
reside in the cognitive background; and both can be at odds with what lies in the
cognitive foreground. Moreover, if deficits in ISE could be empirically linked to
narcissism, this suspicion would be reinforced. As it happens, several studies
have already reported such a link (Boldero et al., 2007a; Boucher, 2007; Brown,
Bosson, & Swann, 2002; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003;
Rosenthal, 2005; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). However, the nature of the link varies.
Moreover, diverging empirical findings are accompanied by differences in theorizing
as to why such a link should exist, what form it should take, and whether ESE
should be involved. We therefore outline below three competing models of how
narcissism relates to both ISE and ESE. We then comment on the viability of these
competing models in the light of our own and further findings.
Three Models of the Link between Narcissism and Self-esteem, Explicit and Implicit
The three models are: (1) the global marker model; (2) the full discrepancy model; and
(3) the partial discrepancy model. We posit (1). However, other researchers to date
have either posited or assumed models (2) and (3). For balance, we articulate all
three models side by side.
The global marker model. This model posits that ISE per se is an overall index of
ego fragility. In particular, the model posits that ISE is inversely related to ego
fragility. Hence, if higher narcissism implies higher ego fragility then higher
narcissism should also imply lower ISE. Note that the global marker model makes
no reference to ESE. As far as the model is concerned, a positive link between ESE
and narcissism exists (at r  .35; Sedikides et al., 2004) but is irrelevant. Accordingly,
the global marker model implies that ESE and ISE should exert separate main effects
on narcissism but should not interact (Figure 1, Pattern A). Furthermore, this model
does not presuppose any particular theory of what might cause ego fragility in
narcissists.
Both indirect and direct empirical findings support the global marker model.
First, ISE has been found to covary simply and negatively (albeit sometimes in
conjunction with other patterns, or given further conditions) with assorted signs of
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ego fragility. Such signs include unstable self-esteem (Zeigler-Hill, 2006), verbal
defensiveness (Kernis, Lakey, & Heppner, 2008), reactivity to threat (McGregor &
Jordan, 2007), and cognitive reactions to success or failure (Greenwald & Farnham,
2000). Second, ISE has at least twice been found to covary simply and negatively
with narcissism (Boldero et al., 2007a; Rosenthal, 2005).
The full discrepancy model. This model posits that ISE and ESE jointly serve as
indices of ego fragility in narcissists. Levels of ESE and ISE, each being either high
or low, can hence be either congruent or discrepant. According to some researchers,
discrepancies between ESE and ISE are either a sign or a cause of ego fragility, and
as such are liable to predict or provoke compensatory self-enhancement. For
example, Kernis et al. (2005) stated that ‘‘fragile self-esteem reflects discrepancies
between individuals’ explicit and implicit feelings of self-worth. Such discrepancies
presumably undermine the certainty and security of individuals’ feelings of self-
worth, thereby heightening their tendencies to engage in self-protection and self-
promotion’’ (p. 314; see also Jordan et al., 2003, p. 970). Hence, if higher narcissism
implies higher ego fragility, then higher narcissism should also imply greater
discrepancies between ESE and ISE. Accordingly, the full discrepancy model implies
that ESE and ISE should interact to predict narcissism but exert no main effects
(Figure 1, Pattern B). Note that the full discrepancy model, unlike the global marker
model, postulates a mechanism to generate ego fragility, a potential advantage.
The full discrepancy model has some indirect empirical support, in that discrepant
ESE and ISE do interact as specified to predict ego fragility. Schro¨der-Abe´,
Rudolph, Wiesner, and Schu¨tz (2007, Study 2) found that people with discrepant
ESE and ISE spent less time contemplating rejecting negative feedback than did
people with congruent ESE and ISE. Moreover, Brin˜ol, Petty, and Wheeler (2006)
FIGURE 1 chematic depiction of various patterns of predicted mean values
derived from hypothetical regressions of narcissism on implicit self-esteem and
explicit self-esteem.
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found that discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes towards external
issues prompted enhanced processing of discrepancy-related information, suggesting
by extension that discrepancies between ISE and ESE might be sufficiently
disconcerting to prompt attempts at resolution. However, to the authors’ knowledge,
no direct empirical support yet exists for the full discrepancy model, as far as
narcissism per se is concerned. In addition, its underlying rationale is open to
question. If discrepancies between ESE and ISE are psychologically disruptive—
generating perennial pressure to resolve them (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999)—why
would trait measures of ESE and ISE remain almost completely uncorrelated?
Relatedly, if ESE and ISE are theorized to arise from largely independent
psychological systems—which by definition do not mutually interfere—then why
should ESE–ISE discrepancies be expected to cause psychological disruption in the
first place?
The partial discrepancy model. This model, like the full discrepancy model, also
posits that ISE and ESE jointly serve as indices of ego fragility in narcissists.
However, what distinguishes the partial discrepancy model is the singling out of just
one cell from the decomposed 26 2 interaction of ESE and ISE—typically, the high
ESE/low ISE cell—with its value being compared to the values in the other three
cells. A higher value in the focal cell is construed as evidence that a combination of
higher ESE and lower ISE characterizes people who are higher in narcissism or ego
fragility (Figure 1, Pattern C).
Patterns roughly consistent with the partial discrepancy model have emerged
empirically. First, various manifestations of ego fragility have been greatest in the
high ESE/low ISE cell. These include in-group bias and dissonance reduction
(Jordan et al., 2003, Studies 2 and 3), less positive interpretations of ambiguous
feedback (Schro¨der-Abe´ et al., 2007, Study 1), and increases in conviction strength
and estimated consensus following manipulations of uncertainty and failure
(McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005). Second,
narcissism itself has been found to be highest in the high ESE/low ISE cell (Brown
et al., 2002; Jordan et al., 2003; Rosenthal, 2005).
However, the rationale for the partial discrepancy model is also open to question.
First, why should the discrepancy between high ESE and low ISE be disruptive but
not the discrepancy between low ESE and high ISE? Technically, the magnitude of
each discrepancy is equivalent. Second, can the ordinal comparison of one particular
cell value to three other cell values do full justice to the entire pattern of cell values
that emerges? Certainly, it is informative to find that narcissism is often numerically
highest when respondents are, say, conjointly higher in ESE and lower in ISE.
However, this is not equivalent to showing that narcissism overall is significantly
higher when both ESE is higher and ISE is lower. The latter is implied only by
significant main effects of ESE and ISE separately (Figure 1, Pattern A). Moreover, a
significant interaction between ESE and ISE, although it can be driven solely by an
extreme value sufficient to engender collateral main effects of ESE and ISE, can also
be driven by a variety of other patterns, including one from which a main effect for
ISE alone is absent (e.g., Figure 1, Pattern D). But such an interaction would not
show that narcissism overall is significantly higher when both ESE is higher and ISE
is lower. Instead, it would show that narcissism in general is significantly higher
when ESE is higher, but that narcissism’s link to ISE depends on ESE in a complex
way on all four cell values (i.e., that it is more negatively related to narcissism as ESE
increases, but more positively related to narcissism as ESE decreases). Still, we do
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agree that, whenever ESE6 ISE interactions are driven solely by one extreme value
in a discrepant cell, their significance can provide a rough means of testing for ego
fragility in narcissists.
The Present Research
Given the questions raised by both discrepancy models, we opted to explore afresh
the links between narcissism, ISE, and ESE, using the more straightforward global
marker model as our theoretical guide. Accordingly, we conducted a sizeable study
(N  200) in which we predicted that narcissism would covary positively with ESE
but negatively with ISE. For methodological completeness, we assessed ISE using
three different key measures of ISE. Two were the NLT and the IAT—the current
‘‘market leaders.’’ We selected our third measure, the computer-based Go No-go
Association Test (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), given its established viability
(Boldero, Rawlings, & Haslam, 2007b), and its conceptual kinship with the IAT. For
methodological security, we assessed both computer-based measures of ISE twice to
help ensure their reliability, and also administered our measures of ISE, ESE, and
narcissism in separate sessions to prevent carry-over effects (Bosson et al., 2000).
Finally, we screened all our data carefully, computed our indices of ISE using
optimized indices, and checked the psychometric adequacy in advance of our main
analyses.
Method
Participants
The sample comprised 206 University of Southampton, UK, undergraduate
students. They ranged in age from 17 to 47 (M¼ 20.5, SD¼ 4.2). Most were female
(85%), English (94%), and White (94%). They received either payment (£30;
approximately $60) or course credit for taking part in the study.
Scheduling, Design, and Procedure
Participants completed six separate sessions. Sessions were run on consecutive days
except that at least one week intervened between Sessions 3 and 4. Narcissism was
measured in Session 1, ESE in Sessions 2 and 4, ISE (the IAT and GNAT) in
Sessions 3 and 5, and ISE again (the NLT) in Session 6.
Participants completed all study sessions on computer, and were urged to avoid
distractions. To run each session, participants downloaded an executable program
(created using Authorware 5.0; Macromedia, 2000), which when activated initially
prompted participants for their password and ID. Upon completing each session,
participants immediately returned data files back to the researchers via e-mail
attachment, with a success rate exceeding 95%. On completion of the final session,
participants were debriefed by e-mail.
Direct Measures
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). This 40-item questionnaire (Raskin &
Hall, 1979) to assess narcissism featured a forced-choice format (Option A or B).
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Sample item: ‘‘I am no better or no worse than most people’’ (A¼ non-narcissistic)
versus ‘‘I think I am a special person’’ (B¼ narcissistic). Participants responded to
each item by clicking one of two labeled onscreen buttons.
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES). This 10-item questionnaire
(Rosenberg, 1965) to assess ESE featured a vertical 4-point scale (from top: strongly
agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). Sample item: ‘‘I feel that I have a number of
good qualities.’’ Participants responded to each item by clicking one of four labeled
onscreen buttons.
Indirect Measures
Two of the three measures of ISE—the IAT and GNAT—were computer-based. In
both tasks, participants repeatedly attempted to quickly and accurately classify
words into categories. Words changed on each trial, but category labels remained
constant across blocks of trials. Average levels of response speed (IAT) or error rate
(GNAT) were computed across block, and differences computed to yield indices of
ISE. To maximize comparability, the IAT and GNAT featured identical stimulus
items (Appendix). These items comprised 12 generically negative words (e.g., filth),
12 generically positive words (e.g., excellent), 3 other-denoting words (they, them,
those), and 3 self-denoting words (me, myself, [first name]—which participants had
earlier typed in). Both tasks also featured four identical category labels: Nasty, Nice,
Not-Me, and Me.
GNAT. We modeled our GNAT on Nosek and Banaji (2001). On each trial,
participants had to press, or to refrain from pressing, the space bar before a 600 ms
deadline elapsed, in order to indicate respectively whether a word did, or did not,
belong to two target categories out of a possible four. In the Me & Nice block, for
example, participants had to press the space bar if a word belonged to the categories
Me or Nice (e.g., myself or delight), but to refrain from pressing it if a word belonged
to the categories Not-Me or Nasty (e.g., them or filth).
In each block, a pair of target category labels appeared near the top of the screen.
On each trial, a word appeared below them for 600 ms (the deadline), regardless of
how participants responded. If they responded correctly before the deadline, a green
check mark appeared for 100 ms once the word disappeared; if they responded
incorrectly, a red X appeared instead. An intertrial interval of 250 ms followed. Key
presses made after the deadline were ignored.
Participants’ accuracy at distinguishing target and non-target words in each block
was assessed. In the Me & Nice block, for example, pressing for myself or delight was
coded as a hit, and not pressing as a miss, while not pressing them or filth was coded
as a correct rejection, and pressing as a false alarm. We quantified discriminative
accuracy independently of response bias using d 0 (Green & Swets, 1966). To ensure
index computability, a fix-up value of .005 was added to or subtracted from the
relevant cell whenever participants’ hit or false-alarm rates equaled null or unity,
respectively.
In all, the GNAT comprised four separate blocks, presented in random order.
Each block featured a different pair of target categories: Me & Nice, Me & Nasty,
Not-Me & Nice, and Not-Me & Nasty. Each block consisted of 48 randomly ordered
experimental trials, immediately preceded by 16 randomly ordered practice trials. Of
the 48 experimental trials, 12 featured a Nice word, 12 a Nasty word, 12 a Me word,
148 A. P. Gregg & C. Sedikides
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and 12 a Not-Me word. Each of the 12 Nice and 12 Nice words was presented once,
and each of the three Me and Not-Me words 4 times. The 16 practice trials contained
4 words of each type. Participants also completed a preparatory GNAT. It
comprised two blocks, each containing 24 trials, with Bird and Fish stimuli replacing
Me and Not-Me stimuli.
We operationalized an implicit preference for self as greater accuracy during
compatible blocks (Me & Nice; Not-Me & Nasty) than during incompatible blocks
(Me & Nasty; Not-Me & Nice). A composite index of implicit self-esteem
(GNATALL) was derived by: (a) subtracting d 0 for the Not-Me & Nice block from
d 0 for the Me & Nice block; (b) subtracting d 0 for the Me & Nasty block from d 0 for
the Not-Me & Nasty block; and (c) adding the two resulting difference scores
together.
IAT. We modeled our IAT on Greenwald et al. (1998). On each trial,
participants pressed a key, on the left or right of the keyboard (q or p), to classify
a word presented in the middle of the screen into one of four categories (Me, Nice,
Not-Me, Nasty). Each key corresponded to the two categories the labels of which
appeared on the corresponding side. After each word appeared, a trial did not
advance until participants had pressed a key. Categorization errors were flagged by a
red X, adding a 200 ms delay to each trial. Regardless of accuracy, an ITI of 433 ms
followed.
The IAT comprised two blocks presented in random order: a compatible block
in which category labels were configured to reflect a preference for self (Me and
Nice on the upper right, Not-Me and Nasty on the upper left), and an
incompatible block in which category labels were configured to reflect a preference
for non-self (Me and Nasty on the upper right, Not-Me and Nice on the upper
left). In other words, the IAT featured only dual-categorization blocks. Previous
research indicates the viability of such abbreviations (Teachman, Gregg, &
Woody, 2001).
Both the compatible and incompatible block consisted of 48 experimental trials
preceded by 4 practice trials. Of the 48 experimental trials, 12 featured a Nice word,
12 a Nasty word, 12 a Me word, and 12 a Not-Me word. Each of the 12 Nice and 12
Nasty words were presented once, and each of the three Me and Not-Me words 4
times. The 4 practice trials featured one additional word of each type. Trial order, for
both experimental and practice trials, was randomized under the constraint that
words falling under the Nice or Nasty categories alternated with those falling under
the Me or Not-Me categories. To mark this distinction, Nice and Nasty categories
and stimuli appeared in blue, Me and Not-Me ones in black. Participants also
completed a preparatory IAT. It comprised both a compatible and an incompatible
block, each containing 12 trials, with Bird and Fish stimuli replacing Me and Not-Me
stimuli.
We operationalized an implicit preference for self as faster completion of the
compatible block relative to the incompatible block. To help control for individual
differences in response speed, we computed an adjusted difference score (IATADJ)
that incorporated the essential features of the revised algorithm recommended by
Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). In particular, we (a) replaced all extreme
latencies within each block (5150 ms or 45000 ms) with means derived from the
remaining latencies within that block; (b) recoded latencies less than 350 ms or
greater than 3000 ms to those boundary values; (c) imposed error penalties by
replacing latencies on trials where errors occurred by the mean plus two standard
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deviations of the original block latencies; and (d) divided participants’ difference
scores (i.e., their average latency in the incompatible block minus their average
latency in the compatible block) by the standard deviation of original latencies
across both blocks.1
NLT. The final measure of ISE, administered alone in Session 6, involved a
rating task rather than a compatibility task. By clicking one of seven onscreen
numerals (1¼ strongly dislike to 7¼ strongly like), participants rated their liking for
all 26 letters of the English alphabet (plus 19 ASCII symbols, included to defuse
suspicion). All characters were capitalized, shown in a font both large (48 point) and
familiar (Times New Roman), and presented in random order.
We operationalized an implicit preference for self as a preference for letters in
one’s name relative to letters not in one’s name, controlling for general letter liking.
An index reflecting this (NLTALL) was computed as follows. First, the normative
likeability of each letter was estimated by computing the mean liking for it among
participants whose names lacked that letter (to ensure no contamination by any
implicit preference for self). Second, the rating that each participant gave to each
letter was adjusted by subtracting from it the normative likeability of that letter.
Third, for each participant, adjusted ratings for letters in their name, and for letters
not in their name, were separately averaged, and the latter subtracted from the
former. Repeated letters were counted as one.
Results
Missing or Defective Data
Due to participant dropout and technical failure on the one hand, and task non-
compliance and extreme scores on the other2 (see below), 20 participants did not
supply usable data for at least one of the first five sessions. Across all sessions, fewer
than 3% of the data from explicit measures, and fewer than 6% of the data from
implicit measures, were either missing or defective. Listwise Ns ranged from 185 to
199 across various analyses. A higher dropout rate for the final session led to lower
Ns (114 to 118) for the NLT.
Data Screening Procedures
To protect the integrity of our results, we excluded data that, by conservative
criteria, suggested non-compliance (i.e., that strongly implied a pattern of
anomalously rapid, slow, mistaken, or stereotyped responding). We either applied
criteria recommended by previous researchers (IAT) or criteria we ourselves devised
(GNAT, NLT, explicit measures).
GNAT. We considered participants non-compliant on a GNAT if, across all four
blocks, they failed both to adequately discriminate targets from distractors and
showed a strong bias towards pressing or not pressing. To quantify overall
discrimination, we computed the average hit minus false-alarm rate across all blocks.
On the resulting scale ranging from þ24 (perfect target discrimination) to 724
(perfect distractor discrimination), we deemed scores below þ5 dubious. To quantify
overall bias, we computed the average hit plus false-alarm rate across all blocks.
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On the resulting scale ranging from 0 (never pressed) to 48 (always pressed), we
deemed scores below 12 or above 36 dubious. We also excluded GNAT data from a
session if, in any block, participants responded identically on all trials (i.e., always
did or didn’t press).
IAT. We considered participants non-compliant on an IAT if, across both
blocks, they either made too many errors, or too often responded either too quickly
or slowly. In particular, we excluded data if, on either IAT block, we observed an
error rate of 20% or higher, or observed extreme latencies (i.e., 4150 ms
or 55000 ms) on five or more trials.
NLT. On the NLT, we considered participants non-compliant if they gave every
letter the same rating.
Explicit measures. Computer administration also enabled us to screen self-
reported responses on the basis of their latency (Holden, 1995). On explicit measures,
we considered participants non-compliant if six or more of their responses to a
questionnaire (e.g., 15% of the NPI) either took less than one second, or more than
ten seconds, to complete.
Outliers. Finally, to ensure the robustness of subsequent findings, we screened all
explicit and implicit indices for outliers, defined as any value either less than the 25th
percentile, or greater then the 75th percentile, by a margin of three times the
interquartile range (Tukey, 1977).
Overall Reliability and Positivity Bias
A good index of ISE should possess adequate reliability and validity. We therefore
checked our ISE indices for: (a) internal consistency and test–retest reliability; (b) the
presence of a strong overall positivity bias; and (c) convergent validity in the form of
intercorrelations.
For all indices of ISE, the computation of internal consistency proceeded as
follows: data were split into two equivalent sets; corresponding summary values were
derived; the correlation between these values was computed; and that correlation
was adjusted in line with the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula. For different
indices, the equivalent sets differed. In particular, they took the form of: (a) first and
last names for NLTALL; (b) alternate pairs of trials for IATADJ; and (c) maximally
interspersed (i.e., within randomization constraints) arrays of trials for the
GNATALL. For the IATADJ and the GNATALL, internal consistencies were
averaged across Sessions 3 and 5. Test–retest reliabilities took the form of
correlations between corresponding indices in those sessions.
All indices of ISE exhibited reasonable levels of internal consistency (Table 1,
Column 2). The internal consistency of IATADJ was a little lower than usual (Nosek,
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; r¼ .70 to .90), possibly due to block order being
randomized. On the other hand, that of the GNATALL was markedly higher than
usual (cf. Nosek & Banaji, 2001; r¼ .30), possibly due to the use of practice tasks and
trials.
Variation in true scores reduces correlations across time; but so too does
measurement error. So, to estimate true underlying change, we disattenuated raw
test–retest correlations (Table 1, Columns 3 and 4) using internal consistency
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coefficients. Results suggested that 26% to 46% of the variance in ISE was conserved
over one week, depending on the index.
Overall positivity bias (Table 1, Columns 5 and 6) was quantified in terms by how
much observed scores departed from their theoretical scale midpoint (e.g., zero for
all indices of ISE). Here (and in all subsequent analyses) both RSES scores, and the
IATADJ and GNATALL indices, were averaged across sessions to maximize
measurement reliability. All three implicit indices showed a significant and
pronounced positivity bias, suggesting that, at least at an aggregate level, they
operated as intended. Still, the threshold for positivity varied across indices, with
nearly all participants showing a bias on IATADJ (99%) and GNATALL (96%), but
only a majority showing it on the NLTALL (66%). In addition, although RSES
scores lay mostly towards the upper end of the scale, NPI scores lay mostly towards
the lower end; that is, most of the participants liked themselves without self-
aggrandizing.
Implicit Intercorrelations and Explicit Intercorrelations
Convergence among indices of ISE would be a further indication of validity.
Problematically, previous studies have failed to find such convergence (Bosson et al.,
2000), a defect that characterizes implicit measures generally (Fazio & Olson, 2003),
and is in part due to poor reliability (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). In our
dataset, overall convergence was also modest: all three positive intercorrelations
were low but collectively marginal—pooled N¼ 143; w2(3)¼ 6.30, p¼ .09 (Steiger,
1980). Individually, the NLTALL index did not correlate significantly with either the
IATADJ index, r(118)¼ .11, or the GNATALL index, r(118)¼ .10, both ps4 .10
(disattenuated rs¼ .18 and .22). However, the IATADJ and GNATALL indices did
correlate significantly, r(185)¼ .15, p5 .05 (disattenuated r¼ .18). This may have
been because these indices were (a) composites designed to assess comparative
preference for self versus non-self and (b) derived from measures sharing a similar
TABLE 1 Explicit and Implicit Indices: Reliabilities and Positivity Bias
Index
Internal
consistency
Test–retest
(raw)
Test–retest
(disattenuated)
One-sample
t
Cohen’s
d
Explicit
NPI .81a – – 718.80 71.34
RSES .91b .89 .98 12.80 0.91
Implicit
NLTALL .68
d – – 5.04 0.47
IATADJ .60
c .31 .51 32.24 2.33
GNATALL .75
c .51 .68 24.29 1.74
Notes: N¼ 185–200, except for NLTALL (N¼ 118). For all t-values, p5 .0001. The t-values
reflect the degree to which scores reliably depart from an index midpoint. The d-values
quantify the magnitude of these effects. For explicit indices, internal consistencies represent
Cronbach’s as. For implicit indices, internal consistencies represent split-half correlations
adjusted in line with the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula. Test–retest reliabilities represent
correlations between corresponding indices in different sessions, both raw and disattenuated.
aComputed from Session 1. bAveraged across Sessions 2 and 4. cAveraged across Sessions 3
and 5. dComputed from Session 6.
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modus operandi (see also Rudolph et al., 2008). Moreover, the correlation might
have been higher still if block order in both measures had been held constant instead
of allowed to vary randomly.
As expected, the NPI and RSES correlated moderately positively, r¼ .47,
p5 .0001.
Explicit–Implicit Intercorrelations
Also as expected (Bosson et al., 2000; Rudolph et al., 2008), none of the three indices
of ISE correlated with the RSES (Table 2, upper). However, two of these indices—
GNATALL and NLTALL—correlated negatively with the NPI—consistent with our
predictions, as guided by the global marker model. That is, although ISE and ESE
never covaried, ISE and narcissism did, such that higher levels of narcissism implied
lower levels of ISE. Moreover, when ESE was partialed out, these two negative
correlations persisted, even increasing slightly, both to r¼ .21. The two positive
results are consistent with the hypothesis that ISE reflects the fragility of the
narcissistic ego, but independently of ESE.
Testing for ESE6 ISE Interactions
The foregoing implies that ESE and ISE (two times out of three) exerted main effects
on NPI scores. Over and above such main effects, did any interactive effects emerge,
as the full and partial models would predict? Following standard procedure
(Aiken & West, 1991), we centered our predictors (i.e., the RSES scores and each ISE
index), multiplied them to create corresponding interaction scores, and then
regressed NPI scores onto the former prior to regressing them onto the latter. In
no regression did coefficients for interaction scores even approach significance
(Table 3). In other words, no evidence emerged that ESE moderated the simple
inverse relation between narcissism and ISE, as indexed by GNATALL and NLTALL.
Supplementary Analysis I: Composite Index of ISE
Did our study reveal a simple inverse link between ISE and narcissism overall?
To address this question, we standardized and summed our three indices of ISE to
create a composite index, ISECOMP, and then re-ran all pertinent analyses. We
obtained an affirmative answer: the ISECOMP index was inversely related to
narcissism (Table 2, lower) yet did not interact with ESE to predict narcissism
(Table 3, lower).
TABLE 2 Correlations between Explicit and Implicit Indices
Index
RSES
(raw)
RSES
(disattenuated)
NPI
(raw)
NPI
(disattenuated)
NLTALL 7.03 7.04 7.20* 7.27
IATADJ .00 .00 7.04 7.06
GNATALL 7.04 7.05 7.18* 7.23
ISECOMP 7.03 – 7.18* –
Notes: N¼ 185–188, except for NLTALL (N¼ 115). *p5 .05.
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Supplementary Analysis II: GNAT regressions
The composite GNATALL index that inversely predicted narcissism integrated
information from all four GNAT blocks. However, the d 0-values from different
GNAT blocks can also be considered separately, to explore the nuances of implicit
self-evaluation. Accordingly, we simultaneously regressed NPI scores onto the
d 0-values for all four GNAT blocks. Two links emerged: an inverse link to the Me &
Nice block value (b¼7.24, p¼ .01) and a positive link to the Not-Me & Nice block
value (b¼ .18, p¼ .03). That is, not only did high narcissists harbor less positive
automatic associations towards themselves (i.e., Me) but they also harbored more
positive automatic associations towards everything that was not themselves (i.e.,
Not-Me). In contrast, the d 0-values for the two blocks incorporating the category
Nasty were negligible (bs5 .05, ps4 .64). These results suggest that, insofar as ISE
reflects ego fragility in narcissists, it entails a dearth of implicit liking for self relative
to others, not a surfeit of implicit loathing for self relative to others.
Discussion
We found that participants higher in NPI-measured narcissism, despite predictably
scoring higher on a standard measure of ESE, nonetheless scored lower on two out
of three measures of ISE, and on a composite index of ISE. Hence, our findings are
theoretically consistent with the global marker model, but inconsistent with both the
full and partial discrepancy models. Nonetheless, previous research has yielded
diverse findings. Averaging across different studies, what is the predominant thrust,
and what might explain the empirical variation observed? Recently, Bosson et al.
(2008) conducted a helpful meta-analysis of several studies examining the relation
between narcissism, ESE, and ISE, in cases where the ISE was indexed by the IAT
and the IPT. Its results can be fruitfully compared to and contrasted against our own
findings.3
TABLE 3 Regressions of Narcissism on Explicit Self-esteem (Rosenberg), Implicit
Self-esteem (Various Indices), and their Interaction Scores (Multiplicative Product)
Index b t
NLTALL 7.18 72.18*
RSES .52 6.65***
NLTALL6RSES .01 0.12
IATADJ 7.03 70.52
RSES .48 7.25***
IATADJ6RSES 7.07 71.17
GNATALL 7.17 72.62**
RSES .46 7.20***
GNATALL6RSES .06 0.90
ISECOMP 7.16 72.56**
RSES .46 7.15***
ISECOMP6RSES .01 0.11
Notes:N¼ 185–188, except forNLTALL andNLTALL6RSES (N¼ 115). *p5 .05; **p5 .01;
***p5 .0001.
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First, Bosson et al. (2008) found no overall main or interactive effects for the IAT.
This matches our own findings. But might the IAT methodology itself have been at
fault, rather than the hypothesis that narcissists have fragile egos? Recently, the IAT
has been criticized for being susceptible to a salience asymmetry confound
(Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). It turns out that IAT effects are driven, not only
by correspondences in category meaning, but also by correspondences in category
salience. In particular, both negative categories (e.g., Nasty), and categories
involving negation (e.g., Not-Me), are liable to occupy the attentional foreground
together, thereby facilitating the co-classification of their respective stimuli. Thus,
the IAT may be an impure measure of ISE and hence of ego fragility. Nonetheless,
the IAT possesses substantial predictive validity in general (Greenwald, Poehlman,
Uhlmann, & Banaji, in press), and has predicted manifestations of ego fragility in
particular (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Complicating matters further, other
researchers have recently found that, whereas IAT measures of ISE whose valenced
words possess a communal meaning (e.g., friendly/rude) do not correlate with
narcissism, those whose valenced words possess an agentic meaning (e.g., assertive/
submissive) correlate positively with narcissism (Campbell, Bosson, Coheen, Lakey, &
Kernis, 2007). This finding supports the validity of the IAT, but calls into question
whether narcissists’ egos are fragile overall. Rather, they may even be less fragile in
domains that matter to them.
Still, our NLT index of ISE did covary negatively with narcissism, consistent with
narcissists having more fragile egos. Yet our findings here were at odds with those of
Bosson et al. (2008). Their meta-analysis revealed a weak aggregate positive link
between narcissism and preference for name letters (r¼ .09, p¼ .01), a result
suggestive of ego security.4 However, a methodological issue complicates the matter.
Whereas Bosson et al. meta-analyzed people’s preferences for their name initials only
(i.e., the IPT), we analyzed preferences for all their name letters (i.e., the NLT). We
did so to capitalize on all available self-evaluative information, and to maximize the
probability of obtaining a significant effect. (Indeed, when we computed an IPT
index, it failed to correlate significantly with narcissism in our sample: r¼ .06,
p¼ .60.) Still, the aggregate positive link found between narcissism and the IPT must
be reckoned with. Furthermore, Sakellaropoulo and Baldwin (2007) found that
narcissism was higher among people who, after being primed to think narcissisti-
cally, rated name letters as less likeable (what they termed communal ISE) but more
attractive (what they termed agentic ISE), as opposed to any other combination of
these two rating tendencies. This complex three-way interaction merits replication (N
was only 40). However, the broad implication—as for the Campbell et al. (2007)
findings—is that the narcissistic ego may be selectively secure.
Nonetheless, our GNAT index of ISE also covaried negatively with narcissism,
thereby providing a conceptual replication of our findings for the NLT. Moreover, a
similar inverse link between narcissism and the GNAT also emerged in an
unpublished study (N¼ 161) by Boldero et al. (2007a). These researchers employed
a two-block version of GNAT, featuring the equivalent of our Me & Nice and Me &
Nasty blocks. In regression analyses, they found that the inverse link with narcissism
was driven by respondents’ accuracy in the former block (b¼7.20, p¼ .02), but not
in the latter (b¼7.08, p¼ .36), suggesting that higher narcissism entails a dearth of
automatic positive associations towards self. These findings dovetail with our own.
In so doing, they illustrate the potential utility of the GNAT as an index of particular
types of automatic associations towards the self, and help to preserve the hypothesis
that narcissism represents a dynamic overcompensation for a fragile ego.
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Taking a synoptic view of the research literature on the relation of ISE to
narcissism, what conclusions might one draw? The aggregate patterns across IAT
and IPT indices of ISE do not conform to predictions of the simple marker, full
discrepancy, or partial discrepancy models (Bosson et al., 2008). Yet—as the findings
for the GNAT index of ISE illustrate—there remain some tantalizing signs that ISE
and narcissism may be inversely linked. Still, at the level of individual studies, results
are inconsistent and erratic, sometimes matching only one model, sometimes only
another. Although some of this variation may reflect random fluctuation, there is no
shortage of potential systematic moderators that might cause it. These include, not
only the specificity with which ISE is assessed (Campbell et al., 2007; Sakellar-
opoulo & Baldwin, 2007), but also how narcissism is defined and measured
(Bosson & Prewitt-Freilino, 2007) as well as the structural peculiarities of indirect
measures (DeHouwer & Moors, 2007) and individual differences in how people
respond to them (Cai, Sriram, Greenwald, & McFarland, 2004), not to mention even
the gender of participants studied (Tschanz, Morf, & Turner, 1998; and our sample
was largely female). Each possibility raises multiple issues beyond the scope of this
article. But here we confine ourselves to addressing a more foundational question
raised by the conflicting findings to date: why should measures of ISE reflect ego
fragility in the first place?
Closing Thoughts
It is commonly claimed that measures of ISE are especially revealing because
measures of ESE have drawbacks such as a susceptibility to introspective blind spots
(Koole & Pelham, 2003) and self-reporting biases (Jordan et al., 2007). However, it is
not sufficient to criticize the validity of the latter to establish the validity of the
former. One must be able to give a forthright answer to the following question: Why
should spontaneous or automatic positive evaluations of self-denoting or self-
connoting stimuli reflect the presence of a secure rather than a fragile ego?
We close by outlining a possible mechanism relating ISE to ego fragility. It
involves, first, a causal connection between ESE and ISE. In particular, and in line
with conventional views of automaticity (Wegner & Bargh, 1998), ISE is held to
become established over time as multiple distinct episodes of conscious self-
evaluation get gradually proceduralized. Self-symbols (e.g., one’s name) then take on
the automatic valence that attaches to the self. Accordingly, the fewer positive
episodes of conscious self-evaluation people enjoy the less positive their ISE will
eventually turn out to be.
Second, the mechanism involves the presence of some factor or factors capable of
producing a consistent dearth of positive self-evaluations. One possibility, of course, is
a problematic developmental history, long theorized to underlie narcissism
(Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1976), and for which some empirical evidence has recently
emerged (e.g., Otway & Vignoles, 2006). However, non-family factors also merit
consideration, especially given that genes and shared environment are known to be
better predictors of the related constructs of self-esteem and self-esteem stability
(Neiss, Sedikides, & Stevenson, 2006). In addition, an intriguing genes-by-
environment hypothesis suggests itself. If narcissists are dispositionally inclined to
self-enhance (Sedikides & Gregg, 2001) they may often trumpet their self-ascribed
virtues. However, if they do so before unimpressed audiences, they may equally often
receive skeptical feedback. Consequently, despite habitually rehearsing positive self-
evaluations in their own minds, narcissists may habitually encounter criticism
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in public, thereby disrupting the smooth proceduralization of positive self-
evaluations.
Third, the mechanism involves ISE being more resistant to change that ESE. It has
long been theorized that implicit attitudes are more robust than their explicit
counterparts (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) and some empirical evidence bears
out this assertion (Gawronski & Strack, 2004). Admittedly, the matter is complex,
because other evidence suggests that implicit attitudes are malleable (Baccus,
Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). However, when direct comparisons are made, it appears
that, even if implicit attitudes are as easy to induce as explicit ones they subsequently
become more difficult to undo (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). Suppose that this is the
case. Then, as learning history unfolds, levels of ISE should vary progressively less
than levels of ESE. Or, to use a meteorological metaphor, ISE should track the self-
evaluative climate whereas ESE should track the self-evaluative weather.
The relative inertia of ISE may help to explain why the cross-sectional correlation
between ESE and ISE is low. If ISE changes more slowly than ESE, then there is
room for ESE and ISE to diverge over the shorter term, even if they tend to converge
over the longer term. For example, suppose someone’s ESE was persistently low
until adulthood, thereby engendering low ISE. A subsequent rise in adult ESE—
perhaps by way of egotistical overcompensation—would then fail to occasion an
immediate corresponding rise in ISE. Hence, the two forms of self-esteem would fall
out of alignment. Such might be the predicament of the narcissist. Indeed, all three
models reviewed represent attempts to statistically unpack this very premise.
Ultimately, the nature of the link between ISE and narcissism remains obscure
and contentious, despite some promising findings like those obtained in the current
study. However, building and testing putative models of that link, such as the above,
may assist in the achievement of clarity and consensus.
Notes
1. Making or not making any of these four adjustments did not affect either the pattern
or significance of our results. We report the adjusted data, given that it is designed in
principle to reduce the impact of extraneous dispositional variance.
2. Including extreme scores and data suggestive of non-compliance did not affect either
the pattern or significance of any results subsequently reported.
3. This meta-analysis included some of the data derived from the research reported here.
However, as omitting our data from the meta-analysis leaves the substantive picture
unchanged, the comparisons we draw remain valid.
4. Bosson also reported another aggregate finding: a smaller but nonetheless significant
interaction between the IPT index and ESE in predicting narcissism (r¼7.06,
p¼ .05). This interaction was driven by participants with lower ISE and lower ESE
having conspicuously lower levels of narcissism. However, this pattern was predicted
neither by the full discrepancy nor the partial discrepancy model. Hence, regardless of
theoretical approach, the results for the IPT index do not support the hypothesis of
narcissistic ego fragility.
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APPENDIX
Stimuli used in the IAT and GNAT
Me Not-Me Nice Nasty
me they excellent murder
myself them heaven cancer
[first name] those joy war
trust disaster
peace hatred
enjoyment slaughter
friend bomb
honest agony
sweetheart torture
love slime
freedom filth
paradise traitor
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